A Flexible Design for Funding Public Goods

@article{Buterin2019AFD,
  title={A Flexible Design for Funding Public Goods},
  author={Vitalik Buterin and Zo{\"e} Hitzig and E. Glen Weyl},
  journal={Manag. Sci.},
  year={2019},
  volume={65},
  pages={5171-5187}
}
We propose a design for philanthropic or publicly funded seeding to allow (near) optimal provision of a decentralized, self-organizing ecosystem of public goods. The concept extends ideas from quad... 
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