A Fistful of Dollars: Lobbying and the Financial Crisis

  title={A Fistful of Dollars: Lobbying and the Financial Crisis},
  author={Deniz Igan and Prachi Mishra and Thierry Tressel},
  journal={NBER Macroeconomics Annual},
  pages={195 - 230}
Has lobbying by financial institutions contributed to the financial crisis? This paper uses detailed information on financial institutions' lobbying and mortgage lending activities to answer this question. We find that lobbying was associated with more risk-taking during 2000-07 and with worse outcomes in 2008. In particular, lenders lobbying more intensively on issues related to mortgage lending and securitization (i) originated mortgages with higher loan-to-income ratios, (ii) securitized a… 
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