A Fine is a Price

@article{Gneezy2000AFI,
  title={A Fine is a Price},
  author={Uri Gneezy and Aldo Rustichini},
  journal={The Journal of Legal Studies},
  year={2000},
  volume={29},
  pages={1 - 17}
}
The deterrence hypothesis predicts that the introduction of a penalty that leaves everything else unchanged will reduce the occurrence of the behavior subject to the fine. We present the result of a field study in a group of day‐care centers that contradicts this prediction. Parents used to arrive late to collect their children, forcing a teacher to stay after closing time. We introduced a monetary fine for late‐coming parents. As a result, the number of late‐coming parents increased… 
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