A Field Guide to Personalized Reserve Prices

@article{Leme2016AFG,
  title={A Field Guide to Personalized Reserve Prices},
  author={Renato Paes Leme and Martin P{\'a}l and Sergei Vassilvitskii},
  journal={Proceedings of the 25th International Conference on World Wide Web},
  year={2016}
}
We study the question of setting and testing reserve prices in single item auctions when the bidders are not identical. At a high level, there are two generalizations of the standard second price auction: in the lazy version we first determine the winner, and then apply reserve prices; in the eager version we first discard the bidders not meeting their reserves, and then determine the winner among the rest. We show that the two versions have dramatically different properties: lazy reserves are… Expand
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