A Fair Governance: On Inequality, Power and Democracy

@article{Barucca2020AFG,
  title={A Fair Governance: On Inequality, Power and Democracy},
  author={Paolo Barucca},
  journal={Topoi},
  year={2020},
  pages={1-6}
}
Can governments keep the pace of global markets? It is a defining characteristic of the present times, tested and measured within multiple studies, that we are living in an increasingly interconnected economy in which giant companies emerge and compete presenting new goods and products at a global scale. The competing environment of international markets produces quickly growing creatures that old nation-states struggle to understand, monitor and, consequently, regulate. In this regard, the… 
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