A Dynamic Population Model of Strategic Interaction and Migration under Epidemic Risk

@article{Elokda2021ADP,
  title={A Dynamic Population Model of Strategic Interaction and Migration under Epidemic Risk},
  author={Ezzat Elokda and Saverio Bolognani and Ashish Ranjan Hota},
  journal={2021 60th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control (CDC)},
  year={2021},
  pages={2085-2091}
}
In this paper, we show how a dynamic population game can model the strategic interaction and migration decisions made by a large population of agents in response to epidemic prevalence. Specifically, we consider a modified susceptible-asymptomatic-infected-recovered (SAIR) epidemic model over multiple zones. Agents choose whether to activate (i.e., interact with others), how many other agents to interact with, and which zone to move to in a time-scale which is comparable with the epidemic… 

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