A Dynamic Analysis of Licensing : The " Boomerang " Effect and Grant-Back Clauses

  title={A Dynamic Analysis of Licensing : The " Boomerang " Effect and Grant-Back Clauses},
  author={Jai Pil Choi},
  • Jai Pil Choi
  • Published 1999
This paper develops an incomplete contract model of the licensing relationship to analyze the dynamic effects of licensing on R&D competition in the innovation market and to examine the rationale for often observed grant-back clauses. Of particular concern are how the consideration of future competition distorts the licensing relationship and how the "grant-back" clause can mitigate this distortion. I also evaluate the validity of the casual antitrust argument that grant-back clauses may… CONTINUE READING
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