A Deweyan Assessment of Three Major Tendencies in Philosophy of Consciousness

@article{Stango2017ADA,
  title={A Deweyan Assessment of Three Major Tendencies in Philosophy of Consciousness},
  author={Marco Stango},
  journal={Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society: A Quarterly Journal in American Philosophy},
  year={2017},
  volume={53},
  pages={466 - 490}
}
  • Marco Stango
  • Published 28 December 2017
  • Philosophy
  • Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society: A Quarterly Journal in American Philosophy
Abstract:I suggest that John Dewey's approach to the problem of consciousness is both methodologically and metaphysically superior to those found in contemporary debates. Dewey advances a picture of consciousness that avoids the mistakes present in the three major tendencies in contemporary philosophy of consciousness, namely, David J. Chalmers's Naturalistic Dualism, the Phenomenal Concept Strategy, and Daniel C. Dennett's A Priori Physicalism. I argue that Dewey's philosophy of consciousness… 

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