A Defense of Derangement

Abstract

according to B&R, if Davidson had established his "no language" thesis, he would thereby have provided a decisive reason for abandoning the project he has long advocated--viz., that of trying to provide theories of meaning for natural languages by providing recursive theories of truth for such languages. For he would have shown that there are no languages to provide truth (or meaning) theories of. Davidson thus seems to be in the odd position of arguing badly for a claim that would undermine his own work. I think Davidson may well have undermined a philosophical project that he once advocated. But his remark has been taken out of context. His conclusion in 'Derangement' is that "there is no such thing as a language, not if a language is anything like what many philosophers and linguists have supposed." B&R ignore the crucial qualifying remark, which 2

Cite this paper

@inproceedings{Pietroski2005ADO, title={A Defense of Derangement}, author={Paul Pietroski}, year={2005} }