# A DYNAMIC MODEL OF RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION

title={A DYNAMIC MODEL OF RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION},
author={Junfu Zhang},
journal={The Journal of Mathematical Sociology},
year={2004},
volume={28},
pages={147 - 170}
}
• Junfu Zhang
• Published 6 May 2004
• Economics
• The Journal of Mathematical Sociology
Using dimes and pennies on a checkerboard, Schelling (1971, 1978) studied the link between residential preferences and segregational neighborhood patterns. While his approach clearly has methodological advantages in studying the dynamics of residential segregation, Schelling's checkerboard model has never been rigorously analyzed. We propose an extension of the Schelling model that incorporates economic variables. Using techniques recently developed in stochastic evolutionary game theory, we…
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