A Course in Game Theory

  title={A Course in Game Theory},
  author={M. Osborne and A. Rubinstein},
A Course in Game Theory presents the main ideas of game theory at a level suitable for graduate students and advanced undergraduates, emphasizing the theory's foundations and interpretations of its basic concepts. The authors provide precise definitions and full proofs of results, sacrificing generalities and limiting the scope of the material in order to do so. The text is organized in four parts: strategic games, extensive games with perfect information, extensive games with imperfect… Expand
Basic Concepts in Game Theory
This chapter defines the key concepts to understand a fishery game. In particular, the concepts of game, strategy, and the representation of a game in strategic and extensive forms. The most widelyExpand
Mathematical Game Theory and Applications
Several classical models used in economics are presented which include Cournot, Bertrand, Hotelling, and Stackelberg as well as coverage of modern branches of game theory such as negotiation models, potential games, parlor games, and best choice games. Expand
GAME THEORY: Analysis of Strategic Thinking. Part I: Static Games
These notes introduce some notions of the theory of static games: rationality, dominance, rationalizability and equilibrium (Nash, mixed, correlated and self-con…rming). For each of these concepts,Expand
Inductive Game Theory: A Basic Scenario
The aim of this paper is to present a more entire picture of the theory moving from the individual raw experiences, through the inductive derivation of a view, to the implications for future behavior. Expand
An Introductory Course on Mathematical Game Theory
This book presents an introductory and up-to-date course on game theory addressed to mathematicians and economists, and to other scientists having a basic mathematical background, providing a formal description of the classic game-theoretic concepts together with rigorous proofs of the main results in the field. Expand
Game Theory Lecture Notes By
Given a coalitional game, the core may be empty or may be very large. This certainly causes difficulties in getting sharp predictions for the game. The Shapley value is a solution concept which isExpand
Norms in Game Theory
This chapter summarizes two main views on norms and games as emerging in literature on game theory, social science, philosophy and artificial intelligence. The first view originates in the field ofExpand
Game theory in economics and beyond
This essay examines game theory’s transformation to becoming the major tool in economics, arguing that the initial excitement surrounding game theory has dissipated not because game theory hasExpand
Selected Topics in Cooperative Game Theory
This chapter shall provide the theoretical basis coming from cooperative game theory. We start with a survey of historical developments in the field of game theory. After this short excursion, weExpand
Game Theory Lecture Notes by Chapter 3. Strategic Form Games: Examples
In this chapter, a variety of examples of finite games as well as infinite games are provided to help improve the authors' intuitive understanding of strategic form games. Expand


The Folk Theorems For Repeated Games: A Synthesis
The theory of repeated games occupies a central place in noncooperative game theory as it forms a relatively simple platform from which to study dynamic aspects of strategic interaction. In thisExpand
Finite Automata Play A Repeated Extensive Game
Abstract This paper analyzes a two-player game in which each player has to choose an automaton (machine) which plays an infinitely repeated extensive game . We assume that the preferences of theExpand
Information patterns and Nash equilibria in extensive games: 1
Abstract In this paper we explore the relation between information patterns and Nash Equilibria in extensive games. By information we mean what players know about moves made by others, as well as byExpand
Theory of Games and Economic Behavior.
This is the classic work upon which modern-day game theory is based. What began more than sixty years ago as a modest proposal that a mathematician and an economist write a short paper togetherExpand
A Value for n-person Games
Introduction At the foundation of the theory of games is the assumption that the players of a game can evaluate, in their utility scales, every “prospect” that might arise as a result of a play. InExpand
Abstract : Several loosely-related essays on the theory of finite, two-person games are presented. The topics covered are: (1) the block decomposition of symmetric games; (2) saddle points inExpand
A basic problem in the theory of noncooperative games is the following: which Nash equilibria are strategically stable, i.e. self-enforcing, and does every game have a strategically stableExpand
The Structure of Nash Equilibrium in Repeated Games with Finite Automata (Now published in Econometrica, 56 (1988), pp.1259-1282.)
The authors study the Nash equilibria of a two-person, infinitely-repeated game in which players' preferences depend on repeated game payoffs and the complexity of the strategies they use. The modelExpand
On Repeated Games with Complete Information
  • S. Sorin
  • Mathematics, Computer Science
  • Math. Oper. Res.
  • 1986
This work proves several properties of the sets of feasible payoffs and Nash equilibrium payoffs for the n-stage game and for the λ-discounted game and determines the set of equilibrium payoff for the Prisoner's Dilemma corresponding to the critical value of the discount factor. Expand
The chain store paradox
The chain store game is a simple game in extensive form which produces an inconsistency between game theoretical reasoning and plausible human behavior. Well-informed players must be expected toExpand