A Consistent Bargainin

  title={A Consistent Bargainin},
  author={Bhaskar Dutta and DEBRAJRAY and Kunal Sengupta},
Both the core and the bargaining set fail to satisfy a natural requirement of consistency. In excluding imputations to which there exist objections, the core does not assess the “credibility” of such objections. The bargaining set goes a step further. Only objections which have no counterobjections are considered justified. However, the credibility of counterobjections is not similarly assessed. We formulate a notion of a consistent bargaining set in which each objection in a “chain” of… CONTINUE READING
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