A Confutation of Convergent Realism

  title={A Confutation of Convergent Realism},
  author={Larry Laudan},
  journal={Philosophy of Science},
  pages={19 - 49}
  • L. Laudan
  • Published 1 March 1981
  • Philosophy
  • Philosophy of Science
This essay contains a partial exploration of some key concepts associated with the epistemology of realist philosophies of science. It shows that neither reference nor approximate truth will do the explanatory jobs that realists expect of them. Equally, several widely-held realist theses about the nature of inter-theoretic relations and scientific progress are scrutinized and found wanting. Finally, it is argued that the history of science, far from confirming scientific realism, decisively… 
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