A Computational Analysis of the Tournament Equilibrium Set

  title={A Computational Analysis of the Tournament Equilibrium Set},
  author={Felix Brandt and Felix A. Fischer and Paul Harrenstein and Maximilian Mair},
  journal={Social Choice and Welfare},
A recurring theme in the mathematical social sciences is how to select the “most desirable” elements given a binary dominance relation on a set of alternatives. S chwartz’s tournament equilibrium set (TEQ) ranks among the most intriguing, but also among the most enig matic, tournament solutions that have been proposed so far in this context. Due to its unwieldy recu rsive definition, little is known about TEQ. In particular, its monotonicity remains an open proble m up to date. Yet, if TEQ were… CONTINUE READING
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