A Compiler and Verifier for

@inproceedings{Sinha2017ACA,
  title={A Compiler and Verifier for},
  author={R. Sinha},
  year={2017}
}
Trusted hardware primitives such as Intel’s SGX instructions provide applications with a protected address space, called an enclave, for trusted code and data. However, building enclaves that preserve confidentiality of sensitive data continues to be a challenge. The developer must not only avoid leaking secrets via the enclave’s outputs but also prevent leaks via side channels induced by interactions with the untrusted platform. Recent attacks have demonstrated that simply observing the page… CONTINUE READING

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