A Comment on Aumann's Bayesian View

  title={A Comment on Aumann's Bayesian View},
  author={Faruk Gul},
In Aumann [1987], it is asserted that for those who adhere to the “. . .Bayesian view of the world, the notion of equilibrium is an unavoidable consequence. . . ” I discuss two possible interpretations of the information model and show that neither interpretation supports this assertion. The hierarchy representation interpretation renders the prior stage meaningless and hence both the key assumption of Aumann’s theory and its conclusion become impossible to interpret. The prior interpretation… Expand
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