A 2-Person Game with Lack of Information on 1½ Sides

  title={A 2-Person Game with Lack of Information on 1½ Sides},
  author={Sylvain Sorin and Shmuel Zamir},
  journal={Math. Oper. Res.},
We consider a repeated 2-person 0-sum game with incomplete information about the pay-off matrix. Player I (maximizer) knows the real pay-off matrix but he is uncertain about the beliefs of his opponent. We show that in this case the Aumann-Maschler results on incomplete information on one side no longer hold. In particular such a game will not have a value in general, in spite of the fact that one player is fully informed about the state of nature. 

From This Paper

Figures and tables from this paper.


Publications referenced by this paper.
Showing 1-2 of 2 references

The Value of Two-Person

  • J. F. Mertens, S. Zamir
  • 1971

Similar Papers

Loading similar papers…