3. Rational Choice Research on Social Dilemmas: Embeddedness Effects on Trust

  title={3. Rational Choice Research on Social Dilemmas: Embeddedness Effects on Trust},
  author={Vincent Buskens and Werner Raub},
† Stimulating comments of and discussions with Jeroen Weesie and other members of our Utrecht group " Cooperation in Social and Economic Relations " are gratefully acknowledged. We also acknowledge helpful comments from participants of the Russell Sage Foundation " Rational Choice Social Research Workshop " and specifically from our discussant, Simon Gächter. The Management of Matches " and under grant 400-05-089 for the project " Commitments and Reciprocity. " The order of authorship is… 

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