22 INTERPERSONALLY COMPARABLE UTILITY October 1998 draft of a contribution to

  title={22 INTERPERSONALLY COMPARABLE UTILITY October 1998 draft of a contribution to},
  author={Salvador Barber{\`a} and Peter J. Hammond and Christian Seidl},
This chapter supplements the earlier reviews in Hammond (1991a) and Suzumura (1996) by concentrating on four issues. The first is that in welfare economics interpersonal comparisons are only needed to go beyond Pareto efficiency or Pareto improvements. The second concerns the need for interpersonal comparisons in social choice theory, to escape Arrow’s impossibility theorem. The third issue is how to revise Arrow’s independence of irrelevant alternatives condition so that interpersonal… CONTINUE READING

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