Corpus ID: 33596188

2 Elections , Accountability , and the Role of Challengers

  title={2 Elections , Accountability , and the Role of Challengers},
  author={S. Gordon and G. Huber},
  • S. Gordon, G. Huber
  • Published 2006
  • What is the marginal effect of competitiveness on the power of electoral incentives? Addressing this question empirically is difficult because challenges to incumbents are endogenous to their behavior in office. To overcome this obstacle, we exploit a unique feature of Kansas courts: fourteen districts employ partisan elections to select judges, while seventeen employ noncompetitive retention elections. In the latter, therefore, challengers are ruled out. We find judges in partisan systems… CONTINUE READING

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