1 Trillion Dollar Refund: How To Spoof PDF Signatures

@article{Mladenov20191TD,
  title={1 Trillion Dollar Refund: How To Spoof PDF Signatures},
  author={Vladislav Mladenov and Christian Mainka and Karsten Meyer zu Selhausen and Martin Grothe and J{\"o}rg Schwenk},
  journal={Proceedings of the 2019 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security},
  year={2019}
}
The Portable Document Format (PDF) is the de-facto standard for document exchange worldwide. To guarantee the authenticity and integrity of documents, digital signatures are used. Several public and private services ranging from governments, public enterprises, banks, and payment services rely on the security of PDF signatures. In this paper, we present the first comprehensive security evaluation on digital signatures in PDFs. We introduce three novel attack classes which bypass the… 

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  • Security Engineering
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