(Il)legal Assignments in School Choice

@article{Ehlers2017IllegalAI,
  title={(Il)legal Assignments in School Choice},
  author={Lars Ehlers and Thayer Morrill},
  journal={The Review of Economic Studies},
  year={2017}
}
In public school choice, students with strict preferences are assigned to schools. Schools are endowed with priorities over students. Incorporating constraints from different applications, priorities are often modelled as choice functions over sets of students. It has been argued that the most desirable criterion for an assignment is stability; there should not exist any blocking pair: no student shall prefer some school to her assigned school and have higher priority than some student who… 

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