'Necessary', 'a priori' and 'analytic'

@article{Sloman1965NecessaryP,
  title={'Necessary', 'a priori' and 'analytic'},
  author={Aaron Sloman},
  journal={Analysis},
  year={1965},
  volume={26},
  pages={12-16}
}
  • A. Sloman
  • Published 1 October 1965
  • Philosophy
  • Analysis
I T is frequently taken for granted, both by people discussing logical distinctions1 and by people using them2, that the terms 'necessary', 'a priori', and 'analytic' are equivalent, that they mark not three distinctions, but one. Occasionally an attempt is made3 to establish that two or more of these terms are equivalent. However, it seems to me far from obvious that they are or can be shown to be equivalent, that they cannot be given definitions which enable them to mark important and… 

Are the Notions ‘A Priori Truth’ and ‘Necessary Truth’ Extensionally Equivalent?

  • E. Erwin
  • Philosophy
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy
  • 1974
There is a widely held view that the expressions ‘necessary truth’, ‘a priori truth’ and ‘analytic truth’ either express the same concept or, at least, refer to all and only the same items.

Anti-Exceptionalism about Logic

  • S. Read
  • Philosophy
    The Australasian Journal of Logic
  • 2019
Anti-exceptionalism about logic is the doctrine that logic does not require its own epistemology, for its methods are continuous with those of science. Although most recently urged by Williamson, the

Analytic vs. Synthetic and a Priori vs. A Posteriori

The division of human cognitive faculties into those based on reason and those based on experience belongs to the standard epistemological vocabulary. The controversy between empiricism and

Philosophical Accounts of First-Order Logical Truths

Starting from certain metalogical results (the completeness theorem, the soundness theorem, and Lindenbaum-Scott theorem), I argue that first-order logical truths of classical logic are a priori and

DRAFT: Revised September 15, 2013 Evolution of Geometrical Reasoning Previous title: “Incomputability of Geometrical Reasoning ”.. 3

TLDR
It is shown that there are requirements for the competences that so far have not been met in AI models, and it is not obvious how they could be implemented using current models of computation, even though there are superficially similar achievements.

Overturning negative construal of quantum superposition

Construal of observable facts or events, that is, the manner in which we understand reality, is based not only on mathematical formulas of a theory suggested as a reasonable explanation for physical

The 5 Questions

I was an undergraduate in both mathematics and philosophy at the University of Keele in the 1960s. We studied a little logic in both subjects, but there was barely any attempt to connect logic with

Reasoning About Continuous Deformation of Curves on a torus and other things.

This is one of several online discussions, with examples, of kinds of mathematical competence that seem to have evolved from abilities to perceive and reason about proto-affordances [*] in the

Architectural and Representational Requirements for Seeing Processes, Proto-affordances and Affordances

  • A. Sloman
  • Psychology
    Logic and Probability for Scene Interpretation
  • 2008
This paper, combining the standpoints of philosophy and Artificial Intelligence with theoretical psychology, summarises several decades of investigation by the author of the variety of functions of

Kantian Philosophy of Mathematics and Young Robots

TLDR
It is argued that a suitable multi-functional self-extending architecture will enable human-like mathematical learning within a machine, and can support Kant's philosophy of mathematics, as against Humean philosophies.