“ Build It or Not ” : Normative and Positive Theories of Public-Private Partnerships

@inproceedings{Martimort2006BI,
  title={“ Build It or Not ” : Normative and Positive Theories of Public-Private Partnerships},
  author={David Martimort and Jerome Pouyet},
  year={2006}
}
This paper analyzes whether the two tasks of building infrastructures which are socially useful and managing those assets should be bundled or not. When performances contracts can be written, both tasks should be performed altogether by the same firm when a better design of the infrastructure helps also to save on operating costs (positive externality). Otherwise (negative externality), tasks should be kept split apart and undertaken by different units. In incomplete contracting environments… CONTINUE READING

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