‘Ought implies Can’ and the law

@article{Fox2017OughtIC,
  title={‘Ought implies Can’ and the law},
  author={Chris Fox and Guglielmo Feis},
  journal={Inquiry},
  year={2017},
  volume={61},
  pages={370 - 393}
}
Abstract In this paper, we investigate the ‘ought implies can’ (OIC) thesis, focusing on explanations and interpretations of OIC, with a view to clarifying its uses and relevance to legal philosophy. We first review various issues concerning the semantics and pragmatics of OIC; then we consider how OIC may be incorporated in Hartian and Kelsenian theories of the law. Along the way we also propose a taxonomy of OIC-related claims. 
Reasons and Normativity
Normative reasons are of constant importance to us as agents trying to navigate through life. For this reason it is natural and vital to ask philosophical questions about reasons and the normativeExpand

References

SHOWING 1-10 OF 96 REFERENCES
Ought but Cannot
I assess a series of arguments intended to show that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’. Two are rooted in uses of ‘ought’ in contexts of deliberation and command. A third draws on the distinctive resources ofExpand
VI—Ought but Cannot
I assess a series of arguments intended to show that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’. Two are rooted in uses of ‘ought’ in contexts of deliberation and command. A third draws on the distinctive resources ofExpand
Does ‘Ought’ Imply ‘Can’? And Did Kant Think It Does?
The aim of this article is twofold. First, it is argued that while the principle of ‘ought implies can’ is certainly plausible in some form, it is tempting to misconstrue it, and that this hasExpand
Does ought imply can?
TLDR
It is argued in this paper that due to some problems in their design, Buckwalter & Turri’s conclusions may not be warranted, and the results of a series of studies demonstrating the problems with their design are presented and showing that, with an improved design, people judge that obligation depends on ability after all. Expand
I OUGHT, THEREFORE I CAN
I defend the following version of the ought-implies-can principle: (OIC) by virtue of conceptual necessity, an agent at a given time has an (objective, pro tanto) obligation to do only what the agentExpand
Impossible Obligations are not Necessarily Deliberatively Pointless
Many philosophers accept that ought implies can (OIC), but it is not obvious that we have a good argument for that principle. I consider one sort of argument for it, which seems to be a developmentExpand
Ought, Can, and Presupposition: An Experimental Study
In this paper, I present the results of an experimental study on intuitions about moral obligation (ought) and ability (can). Many philosophers accept as an axiom the principle known as “OughtExpand
`Ought' Conversationally Implies `Can'
The principle that 'ought' implies 'can' is often taken for granted in discussions of determinism, moral dilemmas, and other areas of practical reasoning. Yet the principle is seldom discussedExpand
Does ‘Ought’ Conversationally Implicate ‘Can’?
Walter Sinnott-Armstrong argues that ‘ought’ does not entail ‘can’, but instead conversationally implicates it. I argue that Sinnott-Armstrong is actually committed to a hybrid view about theExpand
‘Ought’ Does Not Imply ‘Can’
According to the Ought-Implies-Can principle (OIC), an agent ought to perform a certain action only if the agent can perform that action. Proponents of OIC interpret this supposed implication inExpand
...
1
2
3
4
5
...