‘In the way’: intelligence, Eden, and British foreign policy towards Italy, 1937–38*

@article{Hefler2018InTW,
  title={‘In the way’: intelligence, Eden, and British foreign policy towards Italy, 1937–38*},
  author={H. Matthew Hefler},
  journal={Intelligence and National Security},
  year={2018},
  volume={33},
  pages={875 - 893}
}
  • H. M. Hefler
  • Published 7 March 2018
  • History, Economics
  • Intelligence and National Security
Abstract In 1937–1938 a divide emerged over Italian appeasement between Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain and his Foreign Minister, Anthony Eden. Chamberlain wanted to appease Mussolini with de jure recognition of his Ethiopian conquest. Eden disagreed and even resigned over the matter. Historians have struggled to define clearly Eden’s resistance. The intelligence archive allows for a reassessment of British policy towards Italy and Eden’s resignation. It shows that secret intelligence was… 
Facing the Dictators: Anthony Eden, the Foreign Office and British Intelligence, 1935–1945
  • D. Lomas
  • History
    The International History Review
  • 2019
Abstract This article uses the inter-war and wartime career of Anthony Eden, as a vehicle to understand the little understood relationship between secret intelligence, British Foreign Secretaries and
‘Clouds of Mutual Suspicion:’ Neville Chamberlain and Appeasement in the Mediterranean
Abstract This article reconsiders scholarly indictments of Neville Chamberlain’s Mediterranean appeasement strategy. It explains why, out of several alternatives available, Chamberlain prioritized

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