‘Delegated’ Legislation in the (New) European Union: A Constitutional Analysis

@article{Schutze2011DelegatedLI,
  title={‘Delegated’ Legislation in the (New) European Union: A Constitutional Analysis},
  author={Robert Schutze},
  journal={ERN: Political Economy (Topic)},
  year={2011}
}
  • R. Schutze
  • Published 1 September 2011
  • Law, Political Science
  • ERN: Political Economy (Topic)
This article brings classic constitutionalism to an analysis of delegated legislation in the European Union. To facilitate such a constitutional analysis, it starts with a comparative excursion introducing the judicial and political safeguards on executive legislation in American constitutionalism. In the European legal order, similar constitutional safeguards emerged in the last fifty years. First, the Court of Justice developed judicial safeguards in the form of a European non‐delegation… 
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          This constitutional rule has exceptions