Śamkara's principle and two ontomystical arguments

@article{Pruss2001amkarasPA,
  title={Śamkara's principle and two ontomystical arguments},
  author={Alexander R. Pruss},
  journal={International Journal for Philosophy of Religion},
  year={2001},
  volume={49},
  pages={111-120}
}
  • A. Pruss
  • Published 1 April 2001
  • Philosophy
  • International Journal for Philosophy of Religion
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