( No ) Foundations of Dominant-Strategy Mechanisms : A Comment on Chung and Ely ( 2007 )

@inproceedings{Brgers2013N,
  title={( No ) Foundations of Dominant-Strategy Mechanisms : A Comment on Chung and Ely ( 2007 )},
  author={Tilman B{\"o}rgers},
  year={2013}
}
This comment revisits Chung and Ely’s [6] paper in which robustly optimal auctions where investigated. Chung and Ely used a maxmin approach to define robust optimality. Chung and Ely provided conditions under which dominant strategy auctions are robustly optimal in their sense. This comment argues that Chung and Ely’s maxmin definition of robustly optimal auctions requires too little of an optimal auction. It is shown that, after a small amendment of Chung and Ely’s definition, dominant… CONTINUE READING

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