"because" and good samaritans

@inproceedings{Tomberlin1977becauseAG,
  title={"because" and good samaritans},
  author={James E. Tomberlin and F. Mcguinness},
  year={1977}
}
Let A and B be statements of the sorts "a is F" or "a does a", where « is some action. And read the deontic ought-operator, 0, as "It ought to be that". Then it is surely true that if A entails B, and OA, then OB. Or, so one might believe. As a reflection of this view, of course, there is the standard deontic principle that if t~A^>B, then v-OA^OB. According to some, however, the Good Samaritan Paradox renders this deontic principle unacceptable. Others, finding this principle fundamental… Expand
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