"Very Nice" trivial equilibria in strategic market games

  title={"Very Nice" trivial equilibria in strategic market games},
  author={Francesca Busetto and Giulio Codognato},
  journal={J. Economic Theory},
Abstract Following Shapley [Theory of Measurement of Economic Externalities, Academic Press, New York, 1976], we study the problem of the existence of a Nash Equilibrium (NE) in which each trading post is either active or “legitimately” inactive, and we call it a Shapley NE. We consider an example of an exchange economy, borrowed from Cordella and Gabszewicz [Games Econ. Behav. 22 (1998) 162–169], which satisfies the assumptions of Dubey and Shubik [J. Econ. Theory 17 (1978) 1–20], and we show… CONTINUE READING


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