Zsombor Z. Méder

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KTI/IE Discussion Papers are circulated to promote discussion and provoque comments. Any references to discussion papers should clearly state that the paper is preliminary. Materials published in this series may subject to further publication. Abstract We study a family of models of tax evasion, where a flat-rate tax finances only the provision of public(More)
The prevalence of cooperation among humans is puzzling because cooperators can be exploited by free riders. Peer punishment has been suggested as a solution to this puzzle, but cumulating evidence questions its robustness in sustaining cooperation. Amongst others, punishment fails when it is not powerful enough, or when it elicits counter-punishment.(More)
Intergroup conflict persists when and because individuals make costly contributions to their group's fighting capacity, but how groups organize contributions into effective collective action remains poorly understood. Here we distinguish between contributions aimed at subordinating out-groups (out-group aggression) from those aimed at defending the in-group(More)
This paper introduces a general framework for dealing with dynamic inconsistency in the context of Markov decision problems. It carefully decouples and examines concepts that are often entwined in the literature: it distinguishes between the decision maker and its various temporal agents, and between the beliefs and intentions of the agents. Classical(More)
This paper introduces a general framework for dealing with dynamic inconsistency in the context of Markov decision problems. It carefully decouples and examines concepts that are often entwined in the literature: it distinguishes between the decision maker and its various temporal agents, and between the beliefs and intentions of the agents. Classical(More)
  • Zsombor Méder, János Flesch, Ronald Peeters, Z Z Méder, J Flesch, R Peeters
  • 2012
This paper lays down conceptual groundwork for optimal choice of a decision maker facing a finite-state Markov decision problem on an infinite horizon. We distinguish two notions of a strategy being favored on the limit of horizons, and examine the properties of the emerging binary relations. After delimiting two senses of optimality, we define a battery of(More)
We examine the survivability of altruistic preferences in the Ultimatum Game through two sets of agent-based simulations. We find that a self-centered, memory-based strategy updating provides a more plausible basis for altruism than classic imitate-your-neighbor learning. If memory of second-player acceptance thresholds is longer than memory of first-player(More)
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