Zoltan Dienes

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  • Zoltan Dienes
  • Perspectives on psychological science : a journal…
  • 2011
Researchers are often confused about what can be inferred from significance tests. One problem occurs when people apply Bayesian intuitions to significance testing-two approaches that must be firmly separated. This article presents some common situations in which the approaches come to different conclusions; you can see where your intuitions initially lie.(More)
The implicit-explicit distinction is applied to knowledge representations. Knowledge is taken to be an attitude towards a proposition which is true. The proposition itself predicates a property to some entity. A number of ways in which knowledge can be implicit or explicit emerge. If a higher aspect is known explicitly then each lower one must also be known(More)
Subjects exposed to strings of letters generated by a finite state grammar can later classify grammatical and nongrammatical test strings, even though they cannot adequately say what the rules of the grammar are (e.g., Reber, 1989). The MINERVA 2 (Hintzman, 1986) and Medin and Schaffer (1978) memory-array models and a number of connectionis? autoassociator(More)
No scientific conclusion follows automatically from a statistically non-significant result, yet people routinely use non-significant results to guide conclusions about the status of theories (or the effectiveness of practices). To know whether a non-significant result counts against a theory, or if it just indicates data insensitivity, researchers must use(More)
The chapter gives an overview of the use of subjective measures of unconscious knowledge. Unconscious knowledge is knowledge we have, and could very well be using, but we are not aware of. Hence appropriate methods for indicating unconscious knowledge must show that the person (a) has knowledge but (b) does not know that she has it. One way of determining(More)
This paper investigates the dissociation between conscious and unconscious knowledge in an implicit learning paradigm. Two experiments employing the artificial grammar learning task explored the acquisition of unconscious and conscious knowledge of structure (structural knowledge). Structural knowledge was contrasted to knowledge of whether an item has that(More)
We explore three methods for measuring the conscious status of knowledge using the artificial grammar learning paradigm. We show wagering is no more sensitive to conscious knowledge than simple verbal confidence reports but is affected by risk aversion. When people wager rather than give verbal confidence they are less ready to indicate high confidence. We(More)
Feature integration theory has recently been revised with two proposals that visual conjunction search can be parallel under some circumstances--either because items with nontarget features are inhibited, or because items with target features are excited. We examined whether excitatory or inhibitory guidance controlled conjunction search for an X(More)
How people learn chunks or associations between adjacent items in sequences was modelled. Two previously successful models of how people learn artificial grammars were contrasted: the CCN, a network version of the competitive chunker of Servan-Schreiber and Anderson [J. Exp. Psychol.: Learn. Mem. Cogn. 16 (1990) 592], which produces local and(More)
The resurgent science of consciousness has been accompanied by a recent emphasis on the problem of measurement. Having dependable measures of consciousness is essential both for mapping experimental evidence to theory and for designing perspicuous experiments. Here, we review a series of behavioural and brain-based measures, assessing their ability to track(More)