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- Ziv Hellman, Dov Samet
- Games and Economic Behavior
- 2012

Article history: Received 30 November 2007 Available online 31 August 2011 JEL classification: D82 D83

- Ziv Hellman
- J. Economic Theory
- 2014

Simon (2003) presented an example of a 3-player Bayesian game with no Bayesian equilibria, leaving open the question of whether or not there are games with no Bayesian approximate equilibria. We present an example of a Bayesian game with two players, two actions and a continuum of states that possesses no Bayesian approximate equilibria, thus resolving the… (More)

- Ziv Hellman, ZIV HELLMAN
- 2008

This paper is concerned with the question of defining the bargaining set, a cooperative game solution, when cooperation takes place in a dynamic setting. The focus is on dynamic cooperative games in which the players face (finite or infinite) sequences of exogenously specified TU-games and receive sequences of imputations against those static cooperative… (More)

We show that every Bayesian game with purely atomic types has a measurable Bayesian equilibrium when the common knowledge relation is smooth. Conversely, for any common knowledge relation that is not smooth, there exists a type space that yields this common knowledge relation and payoffs such that the resulting Bayesian game will not have any Bayesian… (More)

- Ziv Hellman
- TARK
- 2013

We study conditions relating to the impossibility of agreeing to disagree in models of interactive KD45 belief (in contrast to models of S5 knowledge, which are used in nearly all the agreements literature). We show that even when the truth axiom is not assumed it turns out that players will find it impossible to agree to disagree under fairly broad… (More)

- Ziv Hellman, Amit Gal
- ICEIS
- 2003

- Ziv Hellman
- ArXiv
- 2008

Contemporary spreadsheets are plagued by a profusion of errors, auditing difficulties, lack of uniform development methodologies, and barriers to easy comprehension of the underlying business models they represent. This paper presents a case that most of these difficulties stem from the fact that the standard spreadsheet user-interaction paradigm – the… (More)

- Ziv Hellman
- Int. J. Game Theory
- 2013

What happens when priors are not common? We introduce a measure for how far a type space is from having a common prior, which we term prior distance. If a type space has δ prior distance, then for any bet f it cannot be common knowledge that each player expects a positive gain of δ times the sup-norm of f , thus extending no betting results under common… (More)

- Ziv Hellman
- Int. J. Game Theory
- 2014

We show that the no betting characterisation of the existence of common priors over finite type spaces extends only partially to improper priors in the countably infinite state space context: the existence of a common prior implies the absence of a bounded agreeable bet, and the absence of a common improper prior implies the existence of a bounded agreeable… (More)

- Omer Edhan, Ziv Hellman, Dana Sherill-Rofe
- Journal of theoretical biology
- 2017

The question of 'why sex' has long been a puzzle. The randomness of recombination, which potentially produces low fitness progeny, contradicts notions of fitness landscape hill climbing. We use the concept of evolution as an algorithm for learning unpredictable environments to provide a possible answer. While sex and asex both implement similar machine… (More)