Learn More
Proof-Carrying Code (PCC) is a general framework for verifying the safety properties of machine-language programs. PCC proofs are usually written in a logic extended with language-specific typing rules; they certify safety but only if there is no bug in the typing rules. In Foundational Proof-Carrying Code (FPCC), on the other hand, proofs are constructed(More)
Runtime stacks are critical components of any modern software--they are used to implement powerful control structures such as function call/return, stack cutting and unwinding, coroutines, and thread context switch. Stack operations, however, are very hard to reason about: there are no known formal specifications for certifying C-style setjmp/longjmp, stack(More)
Modern proof assistants such as Coq and Isabelle provide high degrees of expressiveness and assurance because they support formal reasoning in higher-order logic and supply explicit machine-checkable proof objects. Unfortunately, large scale proof development in these proof assistants is still an extremely difficult and time-consuming task. One major(More)
A <i>certified binary</i> is a value together with a proof that the value satisfies a given specification. Existing compilers that generate certified code have focused on simple memory and control-flow safety rather than more advanced properties. In this article, we present a general framework for explicitly representing complex propositions and proofs in(More)
ML-style modules are valuable in the development and maintenance of large software systems, unfortunately, none of the existing languages support them in a fully satisfactory manner. The official SML'97 Definition does not allow higher-order functors, so a module that refers to externally defined functors cannot accurately describe its import interface.(More)
Though attractive as a model for elastic on-demand service, cloud computing solutions based on existing hypervisors cannot guarantee that the provider will service a user's requests correctly, and will not leak sensitive information to unauthorized parties. We introduce <b>CertiKOS</b> (<b>Certi</b>fied <b>K</b>it <b>O</b>perating <b>S</b>ystem), a(More)
We study the relationship between Concurrent Separation Logic (CSL) and the assume-guarantee (A-G) method (a.k.a. rely-guarantee method). We show in three steps that CSL can be treated as a specialization of the A-G method for well-synchronized concurrent programs. First, we present an A-G based program logic for a low-level language with built-in locking(More)