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We derive the optimal dynamic contract in a continuous-time principal-agent setting, and implement it with a capital structure (credit line, long-term debt, and equity) over which the agent controls the payout policy. While the project’s volatility and liquidation cost have little impact on the firm’s total debt capacity, they increase the use of credit(More)
We study a continuous-time principal-agent model in which a risk-neutral agent with limited liability must exert unobservable effort to reduce the likelihood of large but relatively infrequent losses. Firm size can be decreased at no cost, and increased subject to adjustment costs. In the optimal contract, investment takes place only if a long enough period(More)
We study the dynamics of risk premia during crises where …nancial intermediaries faces constraints on raising equity capital. Risk premia rise when intermediaries’ equity capital is scarce. We calibrate the model to match two aspects of crises: the nonlinearity of risk premia during crisis episodes, and the speed of adjustment in risk premia from a crisis(More)
This paper presents a unified theory of both the level and sensitivity of pay in competitive market equilibrium, by embedding a moral hazard problem into a talent assignment model. By considering multiplicative specifications for the CEO’s utility and production functions, we generate a number of different results from traditional additive models. First,(More)
This article analyzes the dynamic coordination problem among creditors of a firm with a time-varying fundamental and a staggered debt structure. In deciding whether to roll over his debt, each maturing creditor is concerned about the rollover decisions of other creditors whose debt matures during his next contract period. We derive a unique threshold(More)
I examine the role of information processing costs on post earnings announcement drift. I distinguish between hard information —quantitative information that is more easily processed — and soft information which has higher processing costs. I find that qualitative earnings information has additional predictability for asset prices beyond the predictability(More)
Financing can be cheaper in certain periods than others. For example, in crisis periods, firms face tougher financing terms than in normal times. We develop an analytically tractable dynamic framework for firms facing stochastic financing opportunities. Financially constrained firms choose intertemporal equity issuance, internal cash accumulation, corporate(More)