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It is increasingly recognized that a key component of successful infection control efforts is understanding the complex, two-way interaction between disease dynamics and human behavioral and social dynamics. Human behavior such as contact precautions and social distancing clearly influence disease prevalence, but disease prevalence can in turn alter human(More)
In a recent work [Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 108, 3838 (2011)], Schneider et al. proposed a new measure for network robustness and investigated optimal networks with respect to this quantity. For networks with a power-law degree distribution, the optimized networks have an onion structure-high-degree vertices forming a core with radially decreasing degrees(More)
We study an evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game with two layered graphs, where the lower layer is the physical infrastructure on which the interactions are taking place and the upper layer represents the connections for the strategy adoption (learning) mechanism. This system is investigated by means of Monte Carlo simulations and an extended(More)
Facing the threats of infectious diseases, we take various actions to protect ourselves, but few studies considered an evolving system with competing strategies. In view of that, we propose an evolutionary epidemic model coupled with human behaviors, where individuals have three strategies: vaccination, self-protection and laissez faire, and could adjust(More)
We study how the presence of committed vaccinators, a small fraction of individuals who consistently hold the vaccinating strategy and are immune to influence, impact the vaccination dynamics in well-mixed and spatially structured populations. For this purpose, we develop an epidemiological game-theoretic model of a flu-like vaccination by integrating an(More)
How effective are governmental incentives to achieve widespread vaccination coverage so as to prevent epidemic outbreak? The answer largely depends on the complex interplay among the type of incentive, individual behavioral responses, and the intrinsic epidemic dynamics. By incorporating evolutionary games into epidemic dynamics, we investigate the effects(More)
This Comment corrects the error which appeared in the calculation of the degree distribution of random Apollonian networks [T. Zhou, G. Yan, and B. H. Wang, Phys. Rev. E. 71, 046141 (2005)]. As a result, the expression of P(k), which gives the probability that a randomly selected node has exactly k edges, has the form P(k) alpha 1/[k(k + 1)(k + 2)].
We study a modified prisoner's dilemma game taking place on two-dimensional disordered square lattices. The players are pure strategists and can either cooperate or defect with their immediate neighbors. In the generations each player updates its strategy by following one of the neighboring strategies with a probability dependent on the payoff difference.(More)
We study evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game by considering adaptive strategy-selection time scale among individuals according to a "win-slower, lose-faster" rule: if an individual successfully resists the invasion of an opponent, she is prone to hold her strategy for longer time through decreasing her strategy-selection time scale; otherwise, she(More)
We propose a strategy for achieving maximum cooperation in evolutionary games on complex networks. Each individual is assigned a weight that is proportional to the power of its degree, where the exponent alpha is an adjustable parameter that controls the level of diversity among individuals in the network. During the evolution, every individual chooses one(More)