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Distributed Constraint Optimization (DCOP) is a popular framework for cooperative multi-agent decision making. DCOP is NP-hard, so an important line of work focuses on developing fast incomplete solution algorithms for large-scale applications. One of the few incomplete algorithms to provide bounds on solution quality is k-size optimality, which defines a(More)
There has been significant recent interest in game theoretic approaches to security, with much of the recent research focused on utilizing the leader-follower Stackelberg game model; for example , these games are at the heart of major applications such as the ARMOR program deployed for security at the LAX airport since 2007 and the IRIS program in use by(More)
We study the problem of optimal resource allocation for packet selection and inspection to detect potential threats in large computer networks with multiple computers of differing importance. An attacker tries to harm these targets by sending malicious packets from multiple entry points of the network; the defender thus needs to optimally allocate her(More)
In proof-of-payment transit systems, passengers are legally required to purchase tickets before entering but are not physically forced to do so. Instead, patrol units move about the transit system, inspecting the tickets of passengers, who face fines if caught fare evading. The deterrence of such fines depends on the unpredictability and effectiveness of(More)
There has been significant recent interest in game theoretic approaches to security, with much of the recent research focused on utilizing the leader-follower Stackelberg game model; for example, these games are at the heart of major applications such as the ARMOR program deployed for security at the LAX airport since 2007 and the IRIS program in use by the(More)
Attacker-defender Stackelberg games have become a popular game-theoretic approach for security with deployments for LAX Police, the FAMS and the TSA. Unfortunately, most of the existing solution approaches do not model two key uncertainties of the real-world: there may be noise in the defender's execution of the suggested mixed strategy and/or the(More)
In recent years there has been extensive research on game-theoretic models for infrastructure security. In time-critical domains where the security agency needs to execute complex patrols, execution uncertainty (interruptions) affect the patroller's ability to carry out their planned schedules later. Indeed, experiments in this paper show that in some(More)
Given their existing and potential real-world security applications, Bayesian Stackelberg games have received significant research interest [3, 12, 8]. In these games, the defender acts as a leader, and the many different follower types model the uncertainty over discrete attacker types. Unfortunately since solving such games is an NP-hard problem, scale-up(More)
In proof-of-payment transit systems, passengers are legally required to purchase tickets before entering but are not physically forced to do so. Instead, patrol units move about the transit system, inspecting the tickets of passengers, who face fines if caught fare evading. The deterrence of fare evasion depends on the unpredictability and effectiveness of(More)
k-and t-optimality algorithms [9, 6] provide solutions to DCOPs that are optimal in regions characterized by its size and distance respectively. Moreover, they provide quality guarantees on their solutions. Here we generalise the k-and t-optimal framework to introduce C-optimality, a flexible framework that provides reward-independent quality guarantees for(More)