Yun Kuen Cheung

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Tatonnement is a simple and natural rule for updating prices in Exchange (Arrow-Debreu) markets. In this paper we define a class of markets for which tatonnement is equivalent to gradient descent. This is the class of markets for which there is a convex potential function whose gradient is always equal to the negative of the excess demand and we call it(More)
This paper continues the study, initiated by Cole and Fleischer in [Cole and Fleischer 2008], of the behavior of a tatonnement price update rule in Ongoing Fisher Markets. The prior work showed fast convergence toward an equilibrium when the goods satisfied the weak gross substitutes property and had bounded demand and income elasticities. The current work(More)
This paper studies three types of functions arising separately in the analysis of algorithms that we analyze exactly using similar Mellin transform techniques. The first is the solution to a Multidimensional Divide-and-Conquer (MDC) recurrence that arises when solving problems on points in d-dimensional space. The second involves weighted digital sums.(More)
  • Y K Cheung, Philippe Flajolet, Mordecai Golin, C Y James Lee
  • 2008
This paper studies two functions arising separately in the analysis of algorithms. The first function is the solution to the Multidimensional Divide-And-Conquer (MDC) Recurrence that arises when solving problems involving points in d-dimensional space. The second function concerns weighted digital sums. Let n = (bibi−1 · · · b1b0)2 and SM (n) = i t=0 t(t +(More)
Given a graph where vertices are partitioned into k terminals and non-terminals, the goal is to compress the graph (i.e., reduce the number of non-terminals) using minor operations while preserving terminal distances approximately. The distortion of a compressed graph is the maximum multiplicative blow-up of distances between all pairs of terminals. We(More)
We revisit the problem of designing strategyproof mechanisms for allocating divisible items among two agents who have linear utilities, where payments are disallowed and there is no prior information on the agents' preferences. The objective is to design strategyproof mechanisms which are competitive against the most efficient (but not strategyproof)(More)
Combinatorial auctions (CA) are a well-studied area in algorithmic mechanism design. However, contrary to the standard model, empirical studies suggest that a bidder's valuation often does not depend solely on the goods assigned to him. For instance, in adwords auctions an advertiser might not want his ads to be displayed next to his competitors' ads. In(More)
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