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This paper presents a new combinatorial auction protocol (LDS protocol) that is robust against false-name bids. Inter-net auctions have become an integral part of Electronic Commerce (EC) and a promising field for applying agent and Artificial Intelligence technologies. Although the Internet provides an excellent infrastructure for combinatorial auctions,(More)
We examine the effect of false-name bids on combinatorial auction protocols. False-name bids are bids submitted by a single bidder using multiple identifiers such as multiple e-mail addresses. The obtained results are summarized as follows: 1) The Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism, which is strategy-proof and Pareto efficient when there exists no(More)
Forming eective coalitions is a major research challenge in AI and multi-agent systems. Coalition structure generation (CSG), which involves partitioning a set of agents into coalitions so that social surplus is maximized, is a central research topic due to its computational complexity. In this paper, we present new methods for CSG utilizing recently(More)
Electronic Commerce (EC) has rapidly grown with the expansion of the Internet. Among these activities , auctions have recently achieved huge popularity, and have become a promising field for applying agent and Artificial Intelligence technologies. Although the Internet provides an infrastructure for much cheaper auctioning with many more sellers and buyers,(More)
Internet auctions have become an integral part of Electronic Commerce (EC) and a promising field for applying agent technologies. Although the Internet provides an excellent infrastructure for large-scale auctions, we must consider the possibility of a new type of cheating, i.e., a bidder trying to profit from submitting several bids under fictitious names(More)
This paper presents a method for designing bundles in a combinatorial auction protocol that is robust against false-name bids. Internet auctions have become an integral part of Electronic Commerce and a promising field for applying AI technologies. However, the possibility of a new type of cheating called a false-name bid, i.e., a bid submitted under a(More)
This paper presents an approximate algorithm for the winner determination problem in combinatorial auctions. This algorithm is based on limited discrepancy search (LDS). In-ternet auctions have become an integral part of Electronic Commerce and can incorporate large-scale, complicated types of auctions including combinatorial auctions, where multiple items(More)
This paper analyzes the worst-case efficiency ratio of false-name-proof combinatorial auction mechanisms. False-name-proofness generalizes strategy-proofness by assuming that a bidder can submit multiple bids under fictitious identifiers. Even the well-known Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism is not false-name-proof. It has previously been shown that there is(More)
A combinatorial auction mechanism consists of an allocation rule that defines the allocation of goods for each agent, and a payment rule that defines the payment of each winner. There have been several studies on characterizing strategy-proof allocation rules. In particular, a condition called weak-monotonicity has been identified as a full characterization(More)