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We consider a persuasion game where multiple experts with potentially con ‡icting self-interests attempt to persuade a decision-maker, say, a judge. The judge prefers to take an action that is most appropriate given the state of the world but the experts'preferences over the actions are independent of the state. The judge has no commitment power and takes(More)
a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t In the infinitely repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with side payments, we characterize the Pareto frontier of the set of subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs for all possible combinations of discount factors. Play paths implementing Pareto dominant equilibrium payoffs are uniquely determined in all but the first period. Full(More)
Applying techniques developed by Geanakoplos et al. (1989), this paper analyzes the gift exchange between agents with privately observed nonpaternalistic altruism. I find that gift giving between agents under private information of altruism can be analyzed as a conventional signaling game. After applying standard refinements of signaling games, I show that,(More)
We propose a theory of player turnover in long-term relationships according to which replacement of players suspected of deviation with new players mitigates ine¢ ciency arising from imperfect monitoring even if doing so requires compensating the suspected deviators adequately for them to leave voluntarily. Our theory encompasses turnover allowing and(More)
We analyze a second-price auction with two bidders in which only one of the bidders is informed as to whether the object is valued commonly. We show that any equilibrium strategy of the bidder who is uninformed must be part of an equilibrium when both bidders instead know that the auction is not common value, regardless of the way in which the values are(More)
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