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We consider a persuasion game where multiple experts with potentially con ‡icting self-interests attempt to persuade a decision-maker, say, a judge. The judge prefers to take an action that is most appropriate given the state of the world but the experts'preferences over the actions are independent of the state. The judge has no commitment power and takes(More)
a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t In the infinitely repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with side payments, we characterize the Pareto frontier of the set of subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs for all possible combinations of discount factors. Play paths implementing Pareto dominant equilibrium payoffs are uniquely determined in all but the first period. Full(More)
We study a dynamic cheap talk model with multiple senders where the receiver can choose when to make her decision and communication can take place over time. No player has the ability to commit to any action in the future, in particular, the receiver cannot commit to delay the decision. In contrast to the results in static versions of the model, we show(More)
This paper studies a relational contract model with imperfect public monitoring, where the agent has limited liability. The optimal relational contract produces de…nitive empirical implications that shed light on important features of employment relationships. First and foremost, the optimal relational contract speci…es a "probation phase" at the beginning(More)
This paper studies the impact of an expert's concern for future business on his conduct and market e¢ ciency. In markets for professional services including health care, legal services, consulting and car mechanic services, clients often lack the expertise to assess the value of services provided by an expert both before and after consumption. Clients'(More)
We propose a theory of player turnover in long-term relationships according to which replacement of players suspected of deviation with new players mitigates ine¢ ciency arising from imperfect monitoring even if doing so requires compensating the suspected deviators adequately for them to leave voluntarily. Our theory encompasses turnover allowing and(More)
We analyze a second-price auction with two bidders in which only one of the bidders is informed as to whether the object is valued commonly. We show that any equilibrium strategy of the bidder who is uninformed must be part of an equilibrium when both bidders instead know that the auction is not common value, regardless of the way in which the values are(More)
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