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In an irreducible stochastic game, no single player can prevent the stochas-tic process on states from being irreducible, so the other players can ensure that the current state has little effect on events in the distant future. This paper provides a sufficient condition for the folk theorem in irreducible stochastic games with imperfect public monitoring,… (More)

The present paper provides a limit characterization of the payoff set supported by belief-free equilibria in repeated games with private monitoring, as the discount factor approaches one and the noise on private information vanishes. Contrary to the conjecture by Ely, Hörner, and Olszewski (2005), in many of the three-or-more player games, the payoff set is… (More)

This paper studies N player infinitely repeated games with imperfect private monitoring where the discount factor is close to unity. Ely and Valimaki [4] (written as EV below) construct a strategy which makes players indifferent among their actions in each period and show the folk theorem in prisoner's dilemma games with two players when monitoring is… (More)

- Takuo Sugaya, Eduardo Faingold, Drew Fudenberg, Edoardo Grillo, Johannes Hörner, Yuhta Ishii +9 others
- 2010

We show that the folk theorem generically holds for N-player repeated games with private monitoring when each player's number of signals is su¢ ciently large. Neither cheap talk communication nor public randomization is necessary. and seminar participants at 10th SAET conference, 10th World Congress of the Econometric Society, 22nd Stony Brook Game Theory… (More)

- Drew Fudenberg, David K Levine, Sergiu Hart, Josef Hofbauer, Bill Sandholm, Satoru Takahashi +2 others
- 2008

for helpful comments, and to NSF grants SES-03-14713 and SES-06-646816 for financial support. Abstract: The theory of learning in games studies how, which and what kind of equilibria might arise as a consequence of a long-run non-equilibrium process of learning, adaptation and/or imitation. If agents' strategies are completely observed at the end of each… (More)

We study the perfect type-contingently public ex-post equilibrium (PTXE) of repeated games with incomplete information where players observe imperfect public signals of the actions and the map from actions to signal distributions is itself unknown. The PTXE payoffs when players are patient are determined by the intersection of the maximal half spaces in… (More)

- Yuichi Yamamoto
- 2012

We investigate whether players in a long-run relationship can maintain cooperation when the details of the underlying game are unknown. Specifically , we consider a new class of repeated games with private monitoring, where an unobservable state of the world influences the payoff functions and/or the monitoring structure. Each player privately learns the… (More)

- Yuri Nishihori, Keizo Nagaoka, Nozomu Nishinaga, Kenji Tanaka, Yuichi Yamamoto, Haruhiko Sato +4 others
- ICCE
- 2006

- George J Mailath, Larry Samuelson, Edu, Martin Cripps, Olivier Gossner, Yuichi Yamamoto +2 others
- 2013

This paper, prepared for the Handbook of Game Theory, volume 4 (Peyton Young and Shmuel Zamir, editors, Elsevier Press), surveys work on reputations in repeated games of incomplete information. * We have benefited from our collaboration and discussions with many coauthors and colleagues over the course of many years, and we are deeply grateful to them. We… (More)