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This paper shows that in online auctions like eBay, if bidders can only place bids at random times, then many different equilibria arise besides truthful bidding , despite the option to leave proxy bids. These equilibria can involve gradual bidding, periods of inactivity, and waiting to start bidding towards the end of the auction-bidding behaviors common(More)
This paper presents a new class of tests for hypothesis testing problems with a boundary-sufficient statistic: the Efficient Conditionally Similar tests (ecs). The paper focuses on two-sided testing problems with nuisance parameters, but the theory here developed can be applied more generally. The first part of this paper shows that the new testing(More)
We extend the folk theorem of repeated games to two settings in which players’ information about others’ play arrives with stochastic lags. In our first model, signals are almost-perfect if and when they do arrive, that is, each player either observes an almost-perfect signal of period-t play with some lag or else never sees a signal of period-t play. The(More)
Motivated by the rise of social media, we build a model studying the effect of an economy’s potential for social learning on the adoption of innovations of uncertain quality. Provided consumers are forward-looking (i.e. recognize the value of waiting for information), equilibrium dynamics depend non-trivially on qualitative and quantitative features of the(More)
This paper presents a new class of tests for hypothesis testing problems with a notable feature: a boundary-sufficient statistic. Examples include testing in Linear Instrumental Variables Regression, testing in a class of weakly identified Generalized Method of Moments models, and testing for dynamic effects in a Structural Vector Autoregression identified(More)
We study a canonical model of reputation between a long-run player and a sequence of short-run opponents, in which the long-run player is privately informed about an uncertain state, which determines the monitoring structure in the reputation game. The long-run player plays a stage-game repeatedly against a sequence of short-run opponents. We present(More)
Œis paper develops a model of costly information acquisition, focusing on an application to scienti€c research. When research protocols are not fully transparent, scientists are incentivized to make their experiments more susceptible to false positives, despite their preference for beŠer information. On the other hand, non-transparency can induce a(More)
We show that the folk theorem generically holds forN -player repeated games with private monitoring if the support of each player’s signal distribution is su¢ ciently large. Neither cheap talk communication nor public randomization is necessary. In Chapter 1, we introduce the model, states the assumptions and the main result, and o¤er the overview of the(More)
We study a dynamic model of wage bargaining between a worker and two firms, with public learning about worker-specific productivity (talent). Firms make take-it-or-leaveit offers over time, and hiring is irreversible. Search frictions delay the arrival of one firm, the entrant, while informational frictions prevent the incumbent from observing the entrant’s(More)
We study a canonical model of reputation between a long-run player and a sequence of short-run opponents, in which the long-run player is privately informed about an uncertain state, which determines the monitoring structure in the reputation game. The long-run player plays a stage-game repeatedly against a sequence of short-run opponents. We present(More)
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