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Public school choice—the initiative for broadening families' access to schools beyond their residence area—has broad public support and has been increasingly adopted across the US and abroad. Yet, how to operationalize school choice, i.e., what procedure should be used to assign students to schools, remains hotly debated. An important debate centers around(More)
Agents face a coordination problem akin to the adoption of a network technology. A principal announces investment subsidies that, at minimal cost, attain a given likelihood of successful coordination. Optimal subsidies target agents who impose high externalities on others and on whom others impose low externalities. In relation to recent bailout debates,(More)
In two-sided matching markets, stable mechanisms are vulnerable to various kinds of manipulations. This paper investigates conditions for the student-optimal stable mechanism (SOSM) and the college-optimal stable mechanism (COSM) to be immune to manipulations via capacities and prearranged matches. For SOSM, we find that strongly monotone preferences in(More)
This paper considers the matching problem with regional quotas, in particular, regional minimum quotas. Although such quotas are relevant in many real-world settings, there is a lack of strategy-proof mechanisms that consider regional minimum quotas. We first show that without any restrictions on the region structure, finding a feasible matching that(More)
answered our questions about medical residency in Japan and introduced us to the relevant medical literature. We are grateful to officials at the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare and the Japan Residency Matching Program for discussion. Abstract. Many real matching markets are subject to distributional constraints. These constraints often take the form(More)
We consider a common indivisible good allocation problem in which agents have both social and private endowments. Popular applications include student assignment to on-campus housing, kidney exchange, and particular school choice problems. In a series of experiments Chen and Sönmez (American Economic Review 92: 1669-1686, 2002) have shown that a popular(More)
about medical residency in Japan and introduced us to the relevant medical literature. Abstract. In an attempt to increase the placement of medical residents in rural hospitals , the Japanese government recently introduced " regional caps " which restrict the total number of residents matched within each region of the country. To accommodate regional caps,(More)
In many repeated interactions, repetition is not guaranteed but instead must be agreed upon. We formulate a model of voluntary repetition by introducing outside options to a repeated Prisoner's Dilemma and investigate how the structure of outside options affects the sustainability of mutual cooperation. Under stochastic outside options, the optimal exit(More)
Truthful revelation of preferences has emerged as a desideratum in the design of school choice programs. Gale-Shapley's deferred acceptance mechanism is strategy-proof for students but limits their ability to communicate their preference intensities. This results in ex-ante inefficiency when ties at school preferences are broken randomly. We propose a(More)