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This paper presents an axiomatization of the Shapley value. The balanced cycle contributions property is the key axiom in this paper. It requires that, for any order of all the players, the sum of the claims from each player against his predecessor is balanced with the sum of the claims from each player against his successor. This property is satisfied not(More)
The main contribution of this paper is to give a necessary and sufficient condition under which the Shapley value coincides with the nucleolus, the CIS value and the ENSC value in the following classes of games; airport games (Littlechild and Owen (1973)), bidder collusion games (Graham et al. (1990)) and polluted river games (Ni and Wang (2007)). Along the(More)
In this study, we conducted a laboratory experiment to assess preemptive striking by and towards individuals or groups. In the framework of a preemptive strike game, we set the following four conditions: one person faced another person, one person faced a three-person group, a three-person group faced an individual, and a three-person group faced another(More)