Yoshio Kamijo

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This paper presents an axiomatization of the Shapley value. The balanced cycle contributions property is the key axiom in this paper. It requires that, for any order of all the players, the sum of the claims from each player against his predecessor is balanced with the sum of the claims from each player against his successor. This property is satisfied not(More)
The main contribution of this paper is to give a necessary and sufficient condition under which the Shapley value coincides with the nucleolus, the CIS value and the ENSC value in the following classes of games; airport games (Littlechild and Owen (1973)), bidder collusion games (Graham et al. (1990)) and polluted river games (Ni and Wang (2007)). Along the(More)
Cooperation is fundamental to human societies, and one of the important paths for its emergence and maintenance is reciprocity. In prisoner's dilemma (PD) experiments, reciprocal strategies are often effective at attaining and maintaining high cooperation. In many public goods (PG) games or n-person PD experiments, however, reciprocal strategies are not(More)