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The problem of recommending items from some fixed database has been studied extensively, and two main paradigms have emerged. In content-based recommendation one tries to recommend items similar to those a given user has liked in the past, whereas in collaborative recommendation one identifies users whose tastes are similar to those of the given user and(More)
Shoham, Y., Agent-oriented programming, Artificial Intelligence 60 (1993) 51-92. A new computational framework is presented, called agent-oriented programming (AOP), which can be viewed as a specialization of object-oriented programming. The state of an agent consists of components such as beliefs, decisions, capabilities, and obligations; for this reason(More)
The stated purpose of this book is to offer a complete overview of the ideas and techniques involved in modeling, reasoning about, and building multiagent systems. It is meant to serve both as a textbook for use in graduate classes and a handbook for researchers. The target audience is broad, but in our opinion it is likely to prove an indispensible(More)
Some important classical mechanisms considered in Microeconomics and Game Theory require the solution of a difficult optimization problem. This is true of mechanisms for combinatorial auctions, which have in recent years assumed practical importance, and in particular of the gold standard for combinatorial auctions, the Generalized Vickrey Auction (GVA).(More)
General combinatorial auctions—auctions in which bidders place unrestricted bids for bundles of goods—are the subject of increasing study. Much of this work has focused on algorithms for finding an optimal or approximately optimal set of winning bids. Comparatively little attention has been paid to methodical evaluation and comparison of these algorithms.(More)
In combinatorial auctions, multiple goods are sold simultaneously and bidders may bid for arbitrary combinations of goods. Determining the outcome of such an auction is an optimization problem that is NP-complete in the general case. We propose two methods of overcoming this apparent intractability. The first method, which is guaranteed to be optimal,(More)
We de ne the notion of social conventions in a standard game theoretic framework and identify various criteria of consistency of such conventions with the principle of individual rationality We then investigate the emergence of such conventions in a stochastic setting we do so within a stylized framework currently popular in economic circles namely that of(More)
We present a new approach to representing coalitional games based on rules that describe the marginal contributions of the agents. This representation scheme captures characteristics of the interactions among the agents in a natural and concise manner. We also develop efficient algorithms for two of the most important solution concepts, the Shapley value(More)