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Some important classical mechanisms considered in Microeconomics and Game Theory require the solution of a difficult optimization problem. This is true of mechanisms for combinatorial auctions, which have in recent years assumed practical importance, and in particular of the gold standard for combinatorial auctions, the Generalized Vickrey Auction (GVA).(More)
A new computational framework is presented, called agent-oriented programming (AOP), which can be viewed as a specialization of object-oriented programming. The state of an agent consists of components such as beliefs, decisions, capabilities, and obligations; for this reason the state of an agent is called its mental state. The mental state of agents is(More)
We present GAMUT^1, a suite of game generators designed for testing game-theoretic algorithms. We explain why such a generator is necessary, offer a way of visualizing relationships between the sets of games supported by GAMUT, and give an overview of GAMUTýs architecture. We highlight the importance of using comprehensive test data by benchmarking(More)
We present a new approach to representing coalitional games based on rules that describe the marginal contributions of the agents. This representation scheme captures characteristics of the interactions among the agents in a natural and concise manner. We also develop efficient algorithms for two of the most important solution concepts, the Shapley value(More)
We deene the notion of social conventions in a standard game-theoretic framework, and identify various criteria of consistency of such conventions with the principle of individual rationality. We then investigate the emergence of such conventions in a stochastic setting; we do so within a stylized framework currently popular in economic circles, namely that(More)
We are concerned with the utility of social laws in a computational environment, laws which guarantee the successful coexistence of multiple programs and programmers. In this paper we are interested in the oo line design of social laws, where we as designers must decide ahead of time on useful social laws. In the rst part of this paper we suggest the use of(More)
General combinatorial auctions—auctions in which bidders place unrestricted bids for bundles of goods—are the subject of increasing study. Much of this work has focused on algorithms for finding an optimal or approximately optimal set of winning bids. Comparatively little attention has been paid to methodical evaluation and comparison of these algorithms.(More)