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We examine the behavior of senders and receivers in the context of oligopoly limit pricing experiments in which high prices chosen by two privately informed incumbents may signal to a potential entrant that the industry-wide costs are high and that entry is unprofitable. The results provide strong support for the theoretical prediction that the incumbents(More)
Working papers are in draft form. This working paper is distributed for purposes of comment and discussion only. It may not be reproduced without permission of the copyright holder. Copies of working papers are available from the author. Abstract In the context of platform competition in a two-sided market, we study how ex-ante uncertainty and ex-post(More)
This paper considers vertical restraints in the context of an intrabrand competition model in which a single manufacturer deals with two vertically differentiated retailers. We establish two main results. First, if the market cannot be vertically segmented, the manufacturer will foreclose the low quality retailer either directly by dealing exclusively with(More)
This paper considers vertical relations between an upstream manufacturer and a downstream retailer that can independently obtain a low-quality, discount substitute. The analysis reveals that under full information the retailer offers both varieties only if it is optimal to do so under vertical integration. However, when the retailer is privately informed(More)
This paper considers a mechanism design problem in which a retailer motivates a manufacturer to gather information concerning the demand for its new product. The information will be of value to the retailer, in deciding whether to allocate limited shelf space for the new product. The model reveals that if the retailer cannot observe whether the manufacturer(More)
This paper considers a dynamic platform competition in a market with network exter-nalities. We ask two research questions. The first one asks how the beliefs advantage carries over in time, and whether a low-quality platform can maintain its focal position along time. We show that for very high and very low discount factors it is possible for the(More)
I consider an upstream supplier that supplies an input to an independent downstream firm and in addition sells the final product to consumers. I find that the upstream supplier cannot implement the monopoly outcome without imposing maximum resale price maintenance (RPM). RPM increases social welfare if consumers' valuation for the final product of the(More)
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