#### Filter Results:

- Full text PDF available (15)

#### Publication Year

1998

2018

- This year (1)
- Last 5 years (7)
- Last 10 years (16)

#### Publication Type

#### Co-author

#### Journals and Conferences

Learn More

Experimental economists currently lack a convention for how to pay subjects in experiments with multiple tasks. We provide a theoretical framework for analyzing this question. Assuming monotonicityâ€¦ (More)

- Yaron Azrieli, Ehud Lehrer
- 2007

A (TU) cooperative game is extendable (Kikuta and Shapley, 1986) if every core allocation of each sub-game can be extended to a core allocation of the game. It is strongly extendable if any minimalâ€¦ (More)

- Yaron Azrieli, Roee Teper
- Games and Economic Behavior
- 2011

We consider games with incomplete information Ã la Harsanyi, where the payoff of a player depends on an unknown state of nature as well as on the profile of chosen actions. As opposed to the standardâ€¦ (More)

- Yaron Azrieli
- Games and Economic Behavior
- 2009

Article history: Received 9 April 2008 Available online 27 January 2009 JEL classification: C72

- Yaron Azrieli, Ehud Lehrer
- Int. J. Game Theory
- 2007

In a fuzzy cooperative game the players may choose to partially participate in a coalition. A fuzzy coalition consists of a group of participating players along with their participation level. Theâ€¦ (More)

- Yaron Azrieli, Ehud Lehrer
- Games and Economic Behavior
- 2008

Upon observing a signal, a Bayesian decision maker updates her probability distribution over the state space, chooses an action, and receives a payoff that depends on the state and the action taken.â€¦ (More)

Experiments elicit choices from a given set of decision problems. When multiple decision problems are offered in the same experiment, however, behavior in one decision problem may be distorted by theâ€¦ (More)

- Yaron Azrieli
- Int. J. Game Theory
- 2009

An information structure in a non-cooperative game determines the signal that each player observes as a function of the strategy profile. Such information structure is called non-manipulable if noâ€¦ (More)

- Yaron Azrieli, Ehud Lehrer
- 2006

We suggest a model of categorization based on prototypes. A set of entities, identified with some finite dimensional Euclidian space, is partitioned into a finite number of categories. Such aâ€¦ (More)

- Yaron Azrieli, Eran Shmaya
- Math. Oper. Res.
- 2013

The Lipschitz constant of a finite normalâ€“form game is the maximal change in some player's payoff when a single opponent changes his strategy. We prove that games with small Lipschitz constant admitâ€¦ (More)