Yannai A. Gonczarowski

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A protocol <i>P</i> is <i>Pareto-optimal</i> if no protocol <i>Q</i> can decide as fast as <i>P</i> for all adversaries, while allowing at least one process to decide strictly earlier, in at least one instance. Pareto optimal protocols cannot be improved upon. We present the first Pareto-optimal solutions to consensus and <i>k</i>-set consensus for(More)
We present a polynomial-time algorithm that, given samples from the unknown valuation distribution of each bidder, learns an auction that approximately maximizes the auctioneer&#039;s revenue in a variety of single-parameter auction environments including matroid environments, position environments, and the public project environment. The valuation(More)
We consider a monopolist that is selling <i>n</i> items to a single additive buyer, where the buyer&#226;€™s values for the items are drawn according to independent distributions <i>F</i><sub>1</sub>,<i>F</i><sub>2</sub>,&#226;€¦,<i>F</i><sub><i>n</i></sub> that possibly have unbounded support. It is well known that &#226;€” unlike in the single item case(More)
The Gale-Shapely algorithm for the Stable Marriage Problem is known to take Θ(n2) steps to find a stable marriage in the worst case, but only Θ(n log n) steps in the average case (with n women and n men). In 1976, Knuth asked whether the worst-case running time can be improved in a model of computation that does not require sequential access to the whole(More)
Lying in order to manipulate the Gale-Shapley matching algorithm has been studied by Dubins and Freedman (1981) and by Gale and Sotomayor (1985), and was shown to be generally more appealing to the proposed-to side (denoted as the women in Gale and Shapley’s seminal paper (1962)) than to the proposing side (denoted as men there). It can also be shown that(More)
The Gibbard-Satterthwaite Impossibility Theorem [Gibbard, 1973, Satterthwaite, 1975] holds that dictatorship is the only Pareto optimal and strategyproof social choice function on the full domain of preferences. Much of the work in mechanism design aims at getting around this impossibility theorem. Three grand success stories stand out. On the domains of(More)
Coordinating activities at different sites of a multi-agent system typically imposes epistemic constraints on the participants. Specifying explicit bounds on the relative times at which actions are performed induces combined temporal and epistemic constraints on when agents can perform their actions. This paper characterises the interactive epistemic state(More)
In a distributed algorithm, multiple processes, or agents, work toward a common goal. More often than not, the actions of some agents are dependent on the previous execution (if not also on the outcome) of the actions of other agents. The resulting interdependencies between the timings of the actions of the various agents give rise to the study of methods(More)