Yannai A. Gonczarowski

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A protocol <i>P</i> is <i>Pareto-optimal</i> if no protocol <i>Q</i> can decide as fast as <i>P</i> for all adversaries, while allowing at least one process to decide strictly earlier, in at least one instance. Pareto optimal protocols cannot be improved upon. We present the first Pareto-optimal solutions to consensus and <i>k</i>-set consensus for(More)
The Gale-Shapley algorithm for the Stable Marriage Problem is known to take Θ(n 2) steps to find a stable marriage in the worst case, but only Θ(n log n) steps in the average case (with n women and n men). In 1976, Knuth asked whether the worst-case running time can be improved in a model of computation that does not require sequential access to the whole(More)
Can noncooperative behaviour of merchants lead to a market allocation that prima facie seems anticom-petitive? We introduce a model in which service providers aim at optimizing the number of customers who use their services, while customers aim at choosing service providers with minimal customer load. Each service provider chooses between a variety of(More)
Coordinating activities at different sites of a multi-agent system typically imposes epistemic constraints on the participants. Specifying explicit bounds on the relative times at which actions are performed induces combined temporal and epistemic constraints on when agents can perform their actions. This paper characterises the interactive epis-temic state(More)
Lying in order to manipulate the Gale-Shapley matching algorithm has been studied by Dubins and Freedman (1981) and by Gale and Sotomayor (1985), and was shown to be generally more appealing to the proposed-to side (denoted as the women in Gale and Shapley's seminal paper (1962)) than to the proposing side (denoted as men there). It can also be shown that(More)
We present a novel construction, drawing intuition from a (physical) hydraulic system, constructively showing the existence of a strong Nash equilibrium in any resource selection game, the indifference of all players among Nash equilibria in such games, and the invariance of the load on each given resource across all Nash equilibria. The existence proof(More)
Lying in order to manipulate the Gale-Shapley matching algorithm has been studied in [2] and [3] and was shown to be generally more appealing to the proposed-to side (denoted as the women in [1]) than to the proposing side (denoted as men there). It can also be shown that in the case of lying women, for every woman who is better-off due to lying, there(More)