Yannai A. Gonczarowski

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A protocol <i>P</i> is <i>Pareto-optimal</i> if no protocol <i>Q</i> can decide as fast as <i>P</i> for all adversaries, while allowing at least one process to decide strictly earlier, in at least one instance. Pareto optimal protocols cannot be improved upon. We present the first Pareto-optimal solutions to consensus and <i>k</i>-set consensus for(More)
The Gale-Shapley algorithm for the Stable Marriage Problem is known to take Θ(n 2) steps to find a stable marriage in the worst case, but only Θ(n log n) steps in the average case (with n women and n men). In 1976, Knuth asked whether the worst-case running time can be improved in a model of computation that does not require sequential access to the whole(More)
Coordinating activities at different sites of a multi-agent system typically imposes epistemic constraints on the participants. Specifying explicit bounds on the relative times at which actions are performed induces combined temporal and epistemic constraints on when agents can perform their actions. This paper characterises the interactive epis-temic state(More)
The Gibbard-Satterthwaite Impossibility Theorem (Gibbard, 1973; Satterthwaite, 1975) holds that dictatorship is the only unanimous and strategyproof social choice function on the full domain of preferences. Much of the work in mechanism design aims at getting around this impossibility theorem. Three grand success stories stand out. On the domains of single(More)
Coordinating activities at different sites of a multi-agent system typically imposes epistemic constraints on the participants. Specifying explicit bounds on the relative times at which actions are performed induces combined temporal and epistemic constraints on when agents can perform their actions. This paper characterises the interactive epis-temic state(More)
Many two-sided matching markets, from labor markets to school choice programs, use a clearinghouse based on the applicant-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm, which is well known to be strategy-proof for the applicants. Nonetheless, a growing amount of empirical evidence reveals that applicants misrepresent their preferences when this mechanism is used.(More)