#### Filter Results:

- Full text PDF available (22)

#### Publication Year

2007

2017

#### Publication Type

#### Co-author

#### Publication Venue

#### Key Phrases

Learn More

- Yakov Babichenko, Siddharth Barman
- ArXiv
- 2016

We study computational questions in a game-theoretic model that, in particular, aims to capture advertising/persuasion applications such as viral marketing. Specifically, we consider a multi-agent Bayesian persuasion model where an informed sender (marketer) tries to persuade a group of agents (consumers) to adopt a certain product. The quality of the… (More)

- Yakov Babichenko
- J. ACM
- 2014

We study the query complexity of approximate notions of Nash equilibrium in games with a large number of players <i>n</i> and a constant number of actions <i>m</i>. Our main result states that even for constant <i>ε</i>, the query complexity of an <i>ε</i>-well-supported Nash equilibrium is exponential in <i>n</i>.

- Yakov Babichenko
- Games and Economic Behavior
- 2012

Completely uncoupled dynamic is a repited play of a game, when in every given time the action of every player depends only on his own payo¤s in the past. In this paper we try to formulate the minimal set of necessary conditions that guarantee a convergence to a Nash equilibrium in completely uncoupled model. The main results are: 1. The convergence to a… (More)

- Yakov Babichenko, Siddharth Barman
- ACM Trans. Economics and Comput.
- 2015

We study lower bounds on the query complexity of determining correlated equilibrium. In particular, we consider a query model in which an <i>n</i>-player game is specified via a black box that returns players' utilities at pure action profiles. In this model, we establish that in order to compute a correlated equilibrium, any <i>deterministic</i> algorithm… (More)

We prove that in every normal form <i>n</i>-player game with <i>m</i> actions for each player, there exists an approximate Nash equilibrium in which each player randomizes uniformly among a set of <i>O</i>(log <i>m</i> + log <i>n</i>) pure actions. This result induces an <i>O</i>(<i>N</i> <sup>log log <i>N</i></sup>)-time algorithm for computing an… (More)

- Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko
- J. Economic Theory
- 2012

We conjecture that <b>PPAD</b> has a PCP-like complete problem, seeking a near equilibrium in which all but very few players have very little incentive to deviate. We show that, if one assumes that this problem requires exponential time, several open problems in this area are settled. The most important implication, proved via a "birthday repetition"… (More)

- Yakov Babichenko
- Int. J. Game Theory
- 2010

We study the problem of reaching a pure Nash equilibrium in multi-person games that are repeatedly played, under the assumption of uncoupledness: EVERY player knows only his own payoff function. We consider strategies that can be implemented by finite-state automata, and characterize the minimal number of states needed in order to guarantee that a pure Nash… (More)

- Yakov Babichenko
- Games and Economic Behavior
- 2013

- Yakov Babichenko, Aviad Rubinstein
- ArXiv
- 2016

For a constant , we prove a polyN lower bound on the (randomized) communication complexity of-Nash equilibrium in two-player N N games. For n-player binary-action games we prove an expn lower bound for the (randomized) communication complexity of , -weak approximate Nash equilibrium, which is a profile of mixed actions such that at least 1… (More)